Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model (Q1004397): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 04:00, 29 June 2024

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Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model
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    Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model (English)
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    10 March 2009
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    In a two player game theoretic setup, the authors consider the situation in which player one can observe a private signal, and player two's objective is to guess the signal correctly. Player one can transmit information about the signal, using an urn scheme, in which correct transmission, i.e. successful coordination, is reinforced. The authors show, that the urn scheme achieves asymptotically optimal coordination.
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    Game theory
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    signaling
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    incomplete information
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    urn model
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    evolutionary game theory
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