Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty (Q485574): Difference between revisions

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+A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
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+Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
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+Strategic Information Transmission
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+Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
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+Perfect sequential equilibrium
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+Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
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+Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic Communication with Lying Costs / rank @@
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+Credulity, lies, and costly talk
@@ Property / cites work: Credulity, lies, and costly talk / rank @@
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+Experimental design to persuade
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+Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
@@ Property / cites work: Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles / rank @@
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