Matching with single-peaked preferences (Q1729666): Difference between revisions

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+Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
+Normal rank
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+A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
+Normal rank
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+The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
+Normal rank
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
+Normal rank
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+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
+Normal rank