Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation (Q2490939): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 13:22, 24 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation |
scientific article |
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Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation (English)
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18 May 2006
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majority rule
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manipulation
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non-reversal
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