Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination (Q1044766): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 06:46, 2 July 2024

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Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination
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    Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination (English)
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    15 December 2009
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    The paper under review attempts to show how human beings try to minimize the intellectual resource to make decisions. In particular, how a single game may by played by different types of players. Various concepts of Nash stable (and locally dominant) subspaces are reviewed.
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    Nash stable subspace
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    locally dominant subspace
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