A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions (Q2463577): Difference between revisions

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+Dictatorial domains
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+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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+Normal rank
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+Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
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+Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
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+Manipulation of social choice functions
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+Normal rank
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Normal rank
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+Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
+Normal rank
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+The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
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+Normal rank
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+Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
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+Normal rank
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+A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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