Hyper-stable social welfare functions (Q5964647): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+An example in group preference
@@ Property / cites work: An example in group preference / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Self-selective social choice functions
@@ Property / cites work: Self-selective social choice functions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Majority voting on orders
@@ Property / cites work: Majority voting on orders / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Hyper-stable collective rankings
@@ Property / cites work: Hyper-stable collective rankings / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Tournament solutions and majority voting
@@ Property / cites work: Tournament solutions and majority voting / rank @@
+Normal rank