Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893): Difference between revisions

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+Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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+On randomized matching mechanisms
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+NP-complete stable matching problems
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Q3999327
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+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
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+Normal rank