The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control (Q627120): Difference between revisions

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+A characterization of the single-peaked domain
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+An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
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+Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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+The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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+How hard is it to control an election?
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+Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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+Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
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+Q3266133
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+Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs, and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms
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+Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates
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+Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries
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+When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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+A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
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+A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
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+Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
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+How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
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+Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
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+A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
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+The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
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+Incidence matrices and interval graphs
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+Q4198056
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+Dichotomy for voting systems
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+Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
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+Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
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+Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
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+Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
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+Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
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