The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination (Q2404218): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:34, 14 July 2024

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The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
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    The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination (English)
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    18 September 2017
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    nomination
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    nominating voters
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    Arrow-consistent preference domains
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    Arrow's impossibility theorem
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