Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity (Q331702): Difference between revisions

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+Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
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+Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
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+Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
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+Single-plateaued choice
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+Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
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+Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
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+Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
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+Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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