Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem (Q2099057): Difference between revisions

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+Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
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+Common Agency
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+Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
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+Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
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+Selecting equilibria in common agency games
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+Contracting with Externalities
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