Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation (Q712479): Difference between revisions

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+The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
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+Do voters vote ideologically?
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+Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
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+Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
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+Electoral Systems and Public Spending
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+A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
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+Q5697040
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