Information disclosure on the contest mechanism (Q2222221): Difference between revisions

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+First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
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+Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
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+Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
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+Pivotal persuasion
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+Asymmetric contests with general technologies
@@ Property / cites work: Asymmetric contests with general technologies / rank @@
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+Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
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+Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
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+Q5323812
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+Private versus complete information in auctions
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+On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
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+The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests
@@ Property / cites work: The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests / rank @@
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