On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design (Q5031660): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 00:38, 28 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7474583
Language Label Description Also known as
English
On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7474583

    Statements

    On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design (English)
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    16 February 2022
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    strategic learning
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    robust mechanism design
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    minimax regret
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    dynamic pricing
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    dynamic contracting
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