Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules (Q2500719): Difference between revisions

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+Stable voting schemes
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+Implementability via protective equilibria
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+General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Q3993509
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+Consistency of decision processes
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+Geometry of voting
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+Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
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+The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
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