Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand (Q1668513): Difference between revisions

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+Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
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+Effective affirmative action in school choice
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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+Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples''
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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