Local incentive compatibility with transfers (Q516980): Difference between revisions

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+Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
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+Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
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+Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
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+When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
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+Single-peaked orders on a tree
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+Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
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+Q2816007
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+Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
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+A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
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+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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+Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
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+Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
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+Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
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+A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
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+Q5599348
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+Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders
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+A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+Q3100563
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