Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers (Q1729665): Difference between revisions

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+Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
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+Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
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+Deliberation and Voting Rules
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+Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
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+Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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+Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
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+Strategic Information Transmission
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+Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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+Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
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+The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
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+The More We Know about the Fundamental, the Less We Agree on the Price
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+Expert advice to a voting body
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