Dichotomy for voting systems (Q859982): Difference between revisions

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+Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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+The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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+Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
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+Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
@@ Property / cites work: Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1. / rank @@
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+When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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+Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Q4536344
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+Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
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+The complexity of Kemeny elections
@@ Property / cites work: The complexity of Kemeny elections / rank @@
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+On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
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+Q3624050
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+Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Q4472458
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