Robust contracts with one-sided commitment (Q2661649): Difference between revisions

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+Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
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+Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
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+MARKET‐BASED INCENTIVES
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+A Theory of Wage Dynamics
@@ Property / cites work: A Theory of Wage Dynamics / rank @@
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+Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
@@ Property / cites work: Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion / rank @@
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+Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
@@ Property / cites work: Robust Contracts in Continuous Time / rank @@
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+A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
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+A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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+Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities
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+Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution
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+Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
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+Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment
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