Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging (Q2415756): Difference between revisions

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+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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+Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
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+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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+Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
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+Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
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+Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
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+The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
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+The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
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+The Calculus of Selfishness
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+Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
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