On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition (Q2867517): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 04:01, 7 July 2024

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On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
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    On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition (English)
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    19 December 2013
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    Nash implementation
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    partial honesty
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    single-peaked preferences
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    single-plateaued preferences
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    single-dipped preferences
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