Condorcet meets Bentham (Q492869): Difference between revisions

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+PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
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+Normal rank
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+Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
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+One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
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+Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
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+Q3549455
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+Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
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+Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
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+The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
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+Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
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+Voting rules as statistical estimators
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+Normal rank
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+Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
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+The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
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+Majority rule and general decision rules
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+Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
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