Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma (Q2008513): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 02:05, 21 July 2024
scientific article
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English | Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma |
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Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma (English)
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26 November 2019
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cooperation
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punishment
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monitoring
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reporting
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common resource
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