Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control (Q3392309): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:48, 1 July 2024

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Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
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    Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control (English)
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    14 August 2009
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    computational social choice
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    artificial intelligence
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    computational complexity
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    approval voting
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    procedural control
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    preference aggregation
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    manipulability
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    voting system
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