Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication (Q5868967): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Private Bayesian persuasion
@@ Property / cites work: Private Bayesian persuasion / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4608058
@@ Property / cites work: Q4608058 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
@@ Property / cites work: Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Competition in Persuasion
@@ Property / cites work: Competition in Persuasion / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stress tests and information disclosure
@@ Property / cites work: Stress tests and information disclosure / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The secretary recommendation problem
@@ Property / cites work: The secretary recommendation problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Experimental design to persuade
@@ Property / cites work: Experimental design to persuade / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Persuasion with limited communication capacity
@@ Property / cites work: Persuasion with limited communication capacity / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
@@ Property / cites work: On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
+Normal rank