Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (Q431230): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Created a new Item |
Changed an Item |
||
Property / review text | |||
An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established. | |||
Property / review text: An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established. / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91C99 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6050571 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
NIMBY (not in my backyard) | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: NIMBY (not in my backyard) / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
market design | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: market design / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
nearly robustness to strategic manipulation | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: nearly robustness to strategic manipulation / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
proportional rule | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: proportional rule / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
manipulation game | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: manipulation game / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
core | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: core / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Revision as of 23:55, 29 June 2023
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem |
scientific article |
Statements
Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (English)
0 references
26 June 2012
0 references
An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established.
0 references
NIMBY (not in my backyard)
0 references
market design
0 references
nearly robustness to strategic manipulation
0 references
proportional rule
0 references
manipulation game
0 references
core
0 references