Focal points in framed games. Breaking the symmetry (Q5926095): Difference between revisions

This book describes methods to mathematize games whose possible moves are not indistiguishable. As an example, the author mentions the following game (Figure 1.2, p.~3): Two players each have to choose from three objects, two balls and a cube; if they choose the same object, both of them get some positive payoff, otherwise they get nothing. For psychological reasons, the players will probably prefer to choose the cube (following Schelling, possible moves like the cube are called focal points), but the usual mathematization of games is oblivious to psychological asymmetries of this kind. Normally, the different moves of a game are just arbitrarily labelled, and the labelling should not affect the outcome of the game. The book deals with two different versions of focal points: static focal points for which the psychological asymmetries are fixed from the outset, and dynamic focal points [introduced by \textit{F. Kramarz}, Theory Decis. 40, 277-313 (1996; Zbl 0852.90144)] for which the asymmetries are created or at least influenced by the events during the game. Because he wants to remain faithful to the Harsanyi-Selten requirement of symmetric invariance [\textit{J. Harsanyi} and \textit{R. Selten}, A general theory of equilibrium selection in games, Cambridge MA, MIT Press (1988; Zbl 0693.90098)], modelling focal points requires the introduction of a new class of symmetries (the weak isomorphisms). Several authors have dealt with static focal points before. The author presents the approaches of \textit{M. Bacharach} [in: Binmore, Ken (ed.) et al., Frontiers of game theory. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 255-275 (1993; Zbl 0816.90138)], Jannsen and \textit{M. Bacharach} and \textit{D. O. Stahl} [Games Econ. Behav. 32, No. 2, 220-246 (2000; reviewed below)] (Section 2.4) and then defines the notion of a framed strategic game (Section 2.5). In this framework he can formalize the notion of a static focal point for variable universe matching games. To model dynamic focal points, the author defines framed extensive games (Section 4.4) and the appropriate symmetries (Subsections 4.4.2 \& 4.4.3). The symmetries used are based on a notion of weak isomorphism for extensive games (Chapter 3) which is derived from work of \textit{R. Selten} [Math. Soc. Sci. 5, 269-363 (1983; Zbl 0534.90095)] and Oh.