Mean field linear quadratic games with set up costs (Q367449): Difference between revisions

In this paper, the following linear-quadratic differential game of \(n\) players with cost functions is considered: the equation for the \(i\)th player reads \[ \begin{cases} \dot{x}_i(t)=u_{i}(t),t\in [0,T),\\ x_i(0)=x^0_i; \end{cases} \] and the cost functional for the \(i\)th player is \[ \int_{0}^{T}\Big(\frac{K \delta (u_i(t))}{a_{i}[t]}+x_i^{2}(t)+\alpha u_i^{2}(t)\Big )dt+\beta x_i^{2}(T), \] where \[ \delta(u_i(t))= \begin{cases} 0 \; \text{if}\; u_i(t)=0,\\ 1 \; \text{otherwise}; \end{cases} \] and \[ a_i[t]=b+\frac{1}{n}\Big (1+ \sum_{j\in {P\backslash\{i\}}}\delta(u_j(t))\Big),\quad P=\{1,\dots,n\}. \] Some properties of best response strategies are established and the construction of Nash equilibria is investigated for the given game. Moreover, the game is considered for a large population with an additive disturbance.