On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme (Q381135): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Changed an Item |
Added link to MaRDI item. |
||
links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Revision as of 04:08, 30 January 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme |
scientific article |
Statements
On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme (English)
0 references
15 November 2013
0 references
Summary: We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudorandom functions. Our result halves the signature size at the same security level, compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudorandom function family. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level.
0 references
hash-based signatures
0 references
post-quantum signatures
0 references
pseudorandom functions
0 references
prfs
0 references
security reductions
0 references
applied cryptography
0 references
one-time signature schemes
0 references
winternitz
0 references
EU-CMA
0 references
SU-CMA
0 references
security notions
0 references
adaptive chosen message attacks
0 references
security levels
0 references