Petty corruption (Q946360): Difference between revisions

\textit{A. Lambert-Mogiliansky} et. al [``Petty corruption: a game-theoretic approach.'' Int. J. Econ. Theory 4, 2, 273--297 (2008; doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2008.00078.x)] presented a game theoretic model of interaction between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, in which the value of a project or privilege \(V\) is observed only by the entrepreneur, who then has to face a track of bureaucrats sequentially, any of whom can block or veto the project. Lambert et. al. assume that \(V\) is uniformly distributed. The authors of this article show that the main result of Lambert et. al. can be generalized to the case where \(V\) has an absolutely continuous distribution function over \([0,1]\).