Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. (Q1421898): Difference between revisions
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scientific article
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English | Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. |
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Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. (English)
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3 February 2004
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Let \(G[c,f]\) be a nonatomic congestion game, where \(c\) denotes cost functions and \(f\) denotes a fixed-utility assignment. The paper shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimum of \(G[c,f]\), and gives a sufficient conditions for the equilibrium and the optimum to coincide. In the event that costs are logarithmic, the equilibrium payoff distribution of \(G[c,f]\) coincides with the Harsanyi value of the corresponding transferable utility game -- a remarkable result.
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congestion game
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Aumann-Shapley value
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Harsanyi value
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potential
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