Semiproportional values for TU games (Q1423702): Difference between revisions
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English | Semiproportional values for TU games |
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Semiproportional values for TU games (English)
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7 March 2004
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In the paper, non-negative cooperative games, \((N,v)\), with transferable utility are considered, where the set of all players \(N\) consists of at least 2 players, \(v\) is the characteristic function of the game, and for every coalition \(S\subseteq N\), \(v(S)\geq 0\) and \(v(S)+v(N-S)\neq 0\). For any such game, a family of semiproportional values is defined, and their properties are investigated. The payoff of a single player is calculated as a weighted sum of relative gains (or losses) achieved by the coalitions containing the player. The authors formulate and prove conditions which guarantee the values to be (a)~proportional in case of 2-person games, (b)~efficient, (c)~proportionally marginalist, and (d)~probabilistic. Last but not least, a bilateral probabilistic model is provided, supporting efficient semiproportional values.
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proportional sharing
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probabilistic model
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