Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies (Q1817964): Difference between revisions
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English | Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies |
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Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies (English)
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14 December 2000
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It is well known that the requirements of efficiency and strategy-proofness lead to dictatorship in two agent private good economies, and, more generally, conflict with anonymity when there are more than two agents. In the present setting of the problem efficiency and strategy-proofness do not conflict with anonymity. In a linear production model the authors characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allowed the authors to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.
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strategy-proofness
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efficiency
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linear production set
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