On implementation via demand commitment games (Q1972579): Difference between revisions
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scientific article
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English | On implementation via demand commitment games |
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On implementation via demand commitment games (English)
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11 April 2000
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A noncooperative game called the Simple Demand Commitment Game (SDCG for short) is studied. It is shown that SDCG implements the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any \(n\)-person characteristic function game. This result is an improvement relative to other proposed models. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy which generates the Shapley value outcomes is also given. As shown for 3-person games, an SDCG can implement the core if the game, convex or not, has a core with a nonempty interior.
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demand commitment game
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Shapley value
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core
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convex game
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