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scientific article
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English | A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games |
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A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games (English)
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28 June 1992
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A voting game is given by a simple game together with a preference profile over a set of alternatives. The authors characterize the situations, where the core of the voting game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution for all preference profiles: Either there are at most two alternatives, or the simple games has vetoers, who together constitute a winning coalition.
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voting game
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simple game
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core
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von Neumann-Morgenstern solution
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