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Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
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    Efficient performance in two agent bargaining (English)
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    1987
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    An allocation rule in a bargaining problem is given by two functions from pairs of stated valuations by the two parties, one determining probability of transfer of the item, the other determining a money payment. The author presents a set of conditions which will guarantee that allocation rules in a certain class are both individually rational and efficient.
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    auctions
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    individual rationality
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    efficiency
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    An allocation rule
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    bargaining
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