Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games (Q868531): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
RedirectionBot (talk | contribs)
Removed claims
RedirectionBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
Property / author
 
Property / author: Slim Belhaiza / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / reviewed by
 
Property / reviewed by: Tadeusz Radzik / rank
 
Normal rank

Revision as of 12:34, 12 February 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
scientific article

    Statements

    Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    6 March 2007
    0 references
    The autors study the problem of extreme Nash equilibria in bimatrix games and in their special generalization to \(n\)-person games, called polymatrix games . The first obtained result says that such games can be expressed as parametric linear 0-1 programs. Next this is used to construct the \(E\chi\)-MIP algorithm for the complete enumeration of the extreme equilibria in bimatrix and polymatrix games. This algorithm is numeracally illustrated for 3-person polymatrix games of size \(m\times m\times m\) with \(m\) up to 13. Also, it is compared with an another EEE algorithm of Audet in computational results on randomly generated bimatrix games for sizes \(n\times n\) for \(n\) up to 14.
    0 references
    Nash equilibria
    0 references

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references