On the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in case of concave integrated price flexibility (Q2434633): Difference between revisions

In the introduction of this paper and in its concluding remarks the authors compare carefully their conditions and results for the existence and semi-uniqueness of Cournot equilibria (in their considered case of a class of homogeneous Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and concave integrated price flexibility) with results given up to now. To get their new results they study so-called Nash-sums (the sum of the components of an equilibrium) and show under conditions that if there exist more than one equilibrium \(a, b,\dots\), then \(a=0\) is not an equilibrium (each of the \(n\) one-dimensional production sets has the form \(\mathbb R_+\) or \([0,m_i]\) with \(m_i > 0\)). With the help of this result, theorems are proven stating sufficient conditions for Nash-sums to be injective and to be constant. Chapter 4 contains the main result: a sufficient condition for the existence of at most one equilibrium (this is semi-uniqueness). Results for the existence of a unique equilibrium are added, also some remarks about detected errors in the literature and a self-contained appendix with proofs of facts, for example, of the type that sufficient conditions for strict concavity are fulfilled.