On coalitional semivalues (Q705865): Difference between revisions

\textit{G. Owen} [in: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Lect. Notes Econ. Math. Syst. 141, 76--88 (1977; Zbl 0395.90095)] introduced the concept of coalitional value for transferable utility games. In this frame it was proposed a generalization of the Shapley value to the coalitional structure after this important results other authors proposed some interesting results in this direction: \textit{S. Hart} and \textit{M. Kurz} [Econometrica 51, 1047--1064 (1983; Zbl 0523.90097)] and \textit{P. Dubey, P. Neiman} and \textit{R. J. Weber} [Math. Oper. Res. 6, 122--128 (1981; Zbl 0496.90096)]. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative axiomatization of the coalitional value by means of three axioms (carrier, additivity and generalized anonymity). In this way authors define and study coalitional semivalues as generalizations of semivalues (see Dubey et al (1981)).