Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good (Q1016334): Difference between revisions
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English | Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good |
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Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good (English)
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5 May 2009
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This paper brings new results to the fair division problem. First, it offers a new proof of the existence of an efficient egalitarian allocation [\textit{M. Berliant, W. Thomson, K. Dunz}, J. Math. Econ. 21, No. 3, 201--216 (1992; Zbl 0761.90009)], without topological assumptions. Second, under complete information, such an allocation is unique and can be found using the [\textit{E. Pazner} and \textit{Schmeidler}, Egalitarian-equivalent allocations: A new concept of economic equity, Q. J. Econ. 92, 671--687 (1978)]. Finally, the latter can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-player game.
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fair division
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efficient egalitarian allocation
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Panzer-Schmeidler rule
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