A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness (Q1183703): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 00:37, 5 March 2024
scientific article
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English | A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness |
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A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness (English)
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28 June 1992
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This paper provides conditions under which the ``\(\alpha\)-core'' of a normal form game is nonempty. The ``\(\alpha\)-core'' is a notion due to R. Aumann. It is defined as follows: A strategy combination can be ``\(\alpha\)-blocked'' by a coalition if there is a choice of strategies by the coalition members which yields an outcome strictly preferred by all coalition members, independent of what the players outside of the coalition do. The `` \(\alpha\)-core'' is the set of all strategy combinations that cannot be ``\(\alpha\)-blocked''. The current paper proves the non-emptiness of the ``\(\alpha\)-core'' without assuming completeness or transitivity of the players' preference relations. The main assumption employed is that for any player and any given outcome of the game the set of outcomes that the player strictly prefers to the given outcome is convex.
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incomplete preferences
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intransitive preferences
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\(\alpha\)-core
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