Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 2 (Q1354105): Difference between revisions

[The articles of this volume will not be indexed individually.] This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. Contents: \textit{T. E. S. Raghavan}, Zero-sum two-person games (735--768); \textit{G. Schwarz}, Game theory and statistics (769-779); \textit{A. Friedman}, Differential games (781--799); \textit{S. Clemhout} and \textit{H. Y. Wan, jun.}, Differential games -- economic applications (801--825); \textit{R. B. Myerson}, Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility (827--847); \textit{D. M. Kreps} and \textit{J. Sobel}, Signalling (849--867); \textit{P. K. Dutta} and \textit{R. Radner}, Moral hazard (869--903); \textit{J. McMillan} and \textit{M. Rothschild}, Search (905--927); \textit{P. Hammerstein} and \textit{R. Selten}, Game theory and evolutionary biology (929--993); \textit{B. O'Neill}, Game theory models of peace and war (995--1053); \textit{S. J. Brams}, Voting procedures (1055--1089); \textit{H. Moulin}, Social choice (1091--1125); \textit{P. D. Straffin, jun.}, Power and stability in politics (1127-1151); \textit{M. Kurz}, Game theory and public economics (1153--1192); \textit{H. P. Young}, Cost allocation (1193--1235); \textit{W. Thomson}, Cooperative models of bargaining (1237--1284); \textit{R. J. Weber}, Games in coalitional form (1285--1303); \textit{J. Greenberg}, Coalition structures (1305--1337); \textit{N. Linial}, Game-theoretic aspects of computing (1339--1395); \textit{P. C. Fishburn}, Utility and subjective probability (1397--1435); \textit{J. Geanakoplos}, Common knowledge (1437--1496).