Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements (Q705846): Difference between revisions
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scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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| English | Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements |
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Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements (English)
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16 February 2005
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In this paper the authors show that properly mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (PMNE) are bad predictions in games of strict strategic complements and show that PMNE are unstable under a broad class of learning dynamics. See also the articles by \textit{D. M. Topkis} [SIAM J. Control Optimizat. 17, 773--787 (1979; Zbl 0433.90091)] and \textit{X. Vives} [J. Math. Econ. 19, No.3, 305--321 (1990; Zbl 0708.90094)] in this connection.
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mixed strategy equilibria
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game of strict strategic complementarities
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unstable
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weakly monotone
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