Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game (Q4691965): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 22:19, 19 March 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6964250
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6964250 |
Statements
Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game (English)
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24 October 2018
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noncredible retaliation threats
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credible retaliation threats
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deterrence
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game theory
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smuggling
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terrorism
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