Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (Q5443639): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:01, 19 March 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5237867
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English
Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5237867

    Statements

    Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (English)
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    21 February 2008
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    common-value auctions
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    winner's curse
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    overbidding
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    bounded rationality
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    level-\(k\) model
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    nonequilibrium strategic thinking
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    behavioral game theory
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    experiments
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