The Shapley value for arbitrary families of coalitions (Q2654327): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 23:53, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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| English | The Shapley value for arbitrary families of coalitions |
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The Shapley value for arbitrary families of coalitions (English)
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15 January 2010
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The authors consider cooperative games with a finite set of players. A definition of a value similar to that of Shapley's value is proposed, when the games are defined on a subfamily of coalitions with no structure. Two frameworks are presented: one based on the efficiency, linearity and null player axioms, and the other on linearity and the behavior on unanimity games. In each case, the authors give several properties and examples. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the family of coalitions for the approaches to coincide are presented.
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game theory
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cooperative game
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Shapley value
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unanimity game
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