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Latest revision as of 09:36, 20 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The rationalist conception of logic |
scientific article |
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The rationalist conception of logic (English)
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1987
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The paper argues that first order logic can justly be called logic, whilst second order and similar logics cannot. The argument turns crucially on the recursive enumerability of first order logic, and the significance of this for the epistemological role of logic. Frege's notion of this epistemological role is endorsed; but the notion of knowledge advocated is a sociological one, and thus quite unFregean.
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second order logic
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Frege
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naturalistic epistemology
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