Security of signature schemes in a multi-user setting (Q702188): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 13:54, 28 March 2024
scientific article
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English | Security of signature schemes in a multi-user setting |
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Security of signature schemes in a multi-user setting (English)
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17 January 2005
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Some special attacks on cryptographic primitives used in the so-called multi-user setting motivate the authors to consider the security of signature schemes in this more general setting. They present a security definition for signature schemes in the multi-user setting that accounts for key substitution attacks. They prove (Theorem 6) that any signature scheme that is secure in the single-user setting to one that is secure under the new definitions. The authors consider various signature schemes -- the Schnorr signature scheme, DSA, ECDSA and the Rabin-Williams signature scheme -- and prove that all they are secure in the multiuser setting under some constraints on the parameters (Theorems 7,8,9,11).
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digital signature
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provable security
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multi-user signature schemes
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